A HEGEMONIA SOBRE TODA A TERRA :

YouTube VIDEO - clik 1 20 Sep 12 - Washington Institute clik 2 (em 1:15:30)
"Para começar a guerra, basta 'armar' um atentado contra nós mesmos, e depois culpar o Irã !".
" É só repetir Pearl Harbor, Lusitania, Maine".

The issue of striking Iran is complicated as well. Military action comes in many forms -- the United States has already been involved in covert operations against the regime for several years, such as intrusive intelligence collection by drones, sabotaging equipment bound for Iran, and encouraging defections. And someone has been assassinating Iranian scientists and unleashing computer viruses on the nuclear program. These campaigns continue; according to the Iranian government, the August 17 power outage at the Fordow enrichment site was an act of sabotage. Such quiet interventions could have major advantages over a large-scale overt attack, especially with regard to reducing the likelihood of international censure and Iranian retaliation. This type of shadow war can also be used to push Tehran toward diplomatic compromise.
Meanwhile, international sanctions are beginning to bite into the Iranian economy, and the coming months will show how much the regime's leadership actually cares about that development. On one hand, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei could adopt a mindset more in line with North Korea (which has sustained its revolutionary values for sixty years through three leaders) than China (where the regime persists but the revolution is gone). In that depressing scenario, he is unlikely to want a nuclear compromise. On the other hand, many key figures in Iran would no doubt disagree with this view, and they could win the day. Another complicated issue is what kind of agreement might be reached with Iran. Much attention has been focused on limiting and monitoring the output of the regime's centrifuges, but such efforts are only one means toward the end of keeping Iran from being able to quickly produce nuclear weapons. The parameters of a deal are becoming apparent: namely, Tehran would get to keep many of its enrichment capabilities on condition that the resulting material is shipped out and returned to Iran in the form of fuel rods and plates, which are very difficult to use for weapons. Yet just because the outline of a deal is apparent does not mean the deal can be done, as the long-stalled Israeli-Palestinian talks illustrate.