EUA amarga derrota na Ucrânia, busca saída menos humilhante. Ali Rússia dá as cartas do jôgo.
As we first disclosed in January, a debate is underway within the foreign policy establishment in Washington about what to do with the Ukrainian crisis. On the one hand are the realists, who appear to be led within the administration by Secretary of State John Kerry. Pitted against them are the hardliners, who include Obama’s National Security Adviser Susan Rice, US ambassador to the UN Samantha Power and Assistant Secretary of State Victoria Nuland. Obama, characteristically, refuses to commit himself clearly to one side or the other. Instead, he tilts one way or the other, depending on which side appears stronger.
Since the late autumn, as Russia’s help for the deal with Iran has moved into focus, and as it became clear that Russia would not let the Ukrainians overrun the Donbass, the balance of advantage has tilted towards the realists. However, as we discussed shortly after the Kerry-Putin meeting in Sochi, it is essential to understand the nature of the discussion. The realists in Washington are not friends of Russia. On the contrary, they think of Russia as an adversary - just as the hardliners do. The people we call the “realists” are not seeking friendship or a rapprochement with Russia. They simply see no sense in confronting Russia in Ukraine where Russia is strongest, whilst at the same time being willing to work with Russia on some issues such as the deal with Iran where there is a mutual interest in doing so. True realists, people like (from their very different perspectives) Henry Kissinger and the historian Stephen Cohen, who understand that US national interests are best served by good relations with Russia, and that these require an honest acknowledgement of Russia's legitimate interests, have no voice in the present administration, or in any likely succeeding one. An article (attached below) has just appeared in The National Interest, an international affairs magazine published by the Center for the National Interest, a US think-tank known to be close to the realists in the US foreign policy establishment, which provides a clear statement of their views, and which is obviously intended to make them public as part of the ongoing policy debate. What sets this article apart is its frank admission of the point we repeatedly make: in Ukraine it is Russia that holds all the high cards. That admission could not be made more clearly. In essence what the article says is that Ukraine matters a lot to Russia, but does not matter anything like as much to the US - and matters even less to the US’s European allies. The result is that US and EU support for Ukraine is essentially rhetorical.
Though they talk big about backing Ukraine and “stopping Putin”, what they do in practice is less than little. The result is that Ukraine actually gets from the West microscopic amounts of economic and military support, whilst the West’s overblown rhetoric simply encourages it to engage Russia in a conflict it cannot win. The author of the article has previously warned against arming Ukraine. In this article he makes the point that if weapons deliveries to Ukraine are to be part of a deeper commitment involving some sort of grand policy to confront Russia, then the fact has to be made clear to the American and European publics, who have to be told of the consequences: “….. if the advocates of this course see small arms deliveries as the first step in a substantially broader effort, they should be honest with the American people about their proposed objectives and the costs and benefits they foresee. If the United States is to make confronting Russia an organizing principle of its foreign policy, it will require an extended national commitment that will be unsustainable without broad public support (and difficult to pursue without virtually nonexistent European public support).” It is quite obvious from the rest of the article that the author does not believe public support either in the US or Europe for a policy of extended confrontation with Russia - in Ukraine or elsewhere - would be forthcoming. Recent opinion polls in the NATO states lend strength to that view.
EUA atiçou Ucrânia à guerra, mas agora já rói a corda: não vai encarar Rússia no seu quintal.
Since the US cannot defeat Russia in Ukraine, the author draws the two obvious conclusions: first, that it is contrary to the US’s interests to encourage Ukraine to get drawn into a conflict with Russia, which it is bound to lose; and second, that it is better for the US to acknowledge these realities and seek a negotiated solution to the Ukrainian conflict, rather than court certain defeat. The author could not make these points more plainly. On the first, he puts it this way: “If the United States is not willing to make a commitment to defending Ukraine sufficient to ensure success, how can we encourage Ukrainians to fight and die in a conflict with a very powerful neighbor and with no clear endpoint? Allowing the government in Kiev and the Ukrainians resisting Moscow to think that America is behind them when we are not—or when we are pretending to ourselves that we are—is functionally equivalent to encouraging the 1956 uprising in Hungary, or the 1991-92 Shi’ite uprisings against Saddam Hussein, and then watching the devastating consequences for the courageous people who believe us.”
